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Abstract—Leakage of information in power line communica-
tion networks is a threat to privacy and security both in smart
grids and in-home applications. A way to enhance security is to
encode the transmitted information with a secret key. Relying
on the channel properties, it is possible to generate a common
key at the two communication ends without transmitting it
through the broadcast channel. Since the key is generated locally,
it is intrinsically secure from a possible eavesdropper. Most
of the existing physical layer key generation techniques have
been developed for symmetric channels. However, the power
line channel is in general not symmetric, but just reciprocal.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose two novel methods that
exploit the reciprocity of the power line channel to generate
common information at the two intended users. This information
is processed through different quantization techniques to generate
secret keys. To assess the security of the generated keys, we
analyze the spatial correlation of the power line channels and
verify the low correlation of the possible eavesdropping chan-
nels. The two proposed methods are tested on a measurement
dataset. The results show that the information leaked to possible
eavesdroppers has very low correlation to any secret key.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, power
line communications, reciprocal systems
I. INTRODUCTION
I
NFORMATION in networks where the communication
mean is shared is always at risk, since both authorized and
illegitimate users are given physical access to the network.
Malicious users have therefore a chance to jeopardize the
privacy of other users or, conversely, to send false information
throughout the network. Typical examples of networks where
such risk is particularly threatening are wireless networks and
power line networks (PLNs).
In such physical broadcast (PB) networks, conversely from
classical computer networks, a malicious user can perform
attacks on all the stacks of the ISO/OSI model, including
the MAC and physical layer [1]. In particular, the physical
layer (PHY) comes to play an important role in both planning
attacks to the network and defensive strategies. In fact, since
the physical medium is shared, every input into the network
has an effect on the system outputs. If the network system
can be modeled, then its properties can be used with both
malicious or aiding intent.
The wireless community has extensively relied on the
properties of the physical channel to pursue research and
identify methods for information security. From an information
theoretic point of view, it is possible to guarantee secure
transmission when the intended communication channel has
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higher capacity than the eavesdropper one, by transmitting
information at a sufficiently high rate [2]. However, some
eavesdropper channels might have higher capacity than the
intended one. For this reason, different techniques to enhance
security have been conceived in the communication theory
area, which include secret key generation, prefiltering and
coding techniques [3], [2], [4]. These techniques rely on
different properties of the wireless communication channels to
restrict the information leakage to any possible unauthorized
receiver. Such properties include the channel randomness both
in time and in frequency domain and, especially in time-
division duplexing systems, its symmetry. In fact, if the
channel between two users is symmetric, the randomness of
the channel is common to the two users, i.e. they have access
to the same information. This property is particularly useful
for the secret key generation techniques. The key generation
process includes the common information, which is unknown
to an eventual eavesdropper, thus drastically enhancing the
security of the produced key.
On the other side, in the context of power line transmission
and distribution networks, attacks and defensive strategies are
normally based on system theory. In this case, the network is
modeled as a dynamic system that describes the power flow.
Attacks of different kind aim at altering the perception of the
state of the network, which in turn might bring to a network
failure [5]. In any case, informative signals need to circulate
through the network, therefore a resilient communication
architecture would enhance the PLN security. However, to
our knowledge there is very limited literature about physical-
layer secure communications in PLNs, and it focuses only on
information theoretic analysis [6], [7], [8], [9].
In this regard, Power Line Communications (PLC) is a
well established communication technology in PLNs [10]. This
technology already provides a form of security in the fact that
it uses a communication mean, the power line cables, that is
owned by the utility and therefore not accessible by everybody.
However, an unauthorized user might be able to get physical
access to the network, or the utility might not want to share
some information with part of the network users. Therefore,
additional security measures have to be provided. Since the
PLC physical channel has some properties in common with
the wireless channel, it makes sense to explore physical-layer
security (PLS) techniques developed for wireless in the case
of PLC. However, it has been shown that the PLC channel,
conversely from the wireless one, is rather deterministic, in
general not symmetric [11], [12], and moreover has different
statistical properties [8].
In this paper, we propose a thorough analysis of the
properties of the PLC channel in order to investigate under
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Fig. 1. Traditional communication scheme, with generator either on Port 1
or on Port 2.
what conditions PLS techniques, which exploit common in-
formation at the two legitimate users, developed for wireless
apply also to PLC. However, since the PLC channel is in
general non symmetric, most of the known PLS algorithms
cannot be applied to it. In fact, to the authors knowledge,
very limited work exists on PLS in non-symmetric channels
[13]. In order to overcome this limit, we make use of the
fact that the PLC channel is reciprocal to investigate what
channel state information (CSI) is known to two legitimate
users independently from each other at any given time. In this
context, we propose two new methods to retrieve common CSI.
The first method involves the analysis of the multipath signal
propagation in reciprocal channels. The second method relies
on the exchange of a minimal amount of information between
the two ends, which is however insufficient to a possible
eavesdropper for decrypting the key. The CSI obtained with
the proposed methods can be consequently used to generate
cryptographic keys separately at the two communication ends.
To this purpose, we process the CSI with various quantization
techniques and show the reliability of the generated keys.
We also analyze the spatial correlation in PLNs, in order
to verify the level of security of the obtained CSI against
possible eavesdroppers. Although our investigation focuses on
PLN, the proposed CSI retrieval methods are common to every
reciprocal network, including any kind of passive wired and
wireless network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we briefly summarize the existing PLS techniques based on the
properties of symmetric channels. In Section III, we analyze in
what cases the PLC channel can be considered symmetric. The
two algorithms for PLS in reciprocal channels are proposed
in Section IV, while extended results are presented in Section
V. Conclusions follow in Section VI.
II. CHANNEL-BASED SECURITY APPROACHES IN
WIRELESS
Most of the PHY key generation techniques in wireless
communications, especially the channel-based ones, rely on
the symmetry of the channel [4], i.e. the fact that for every
set of currents and voltages at the two communication ends
that satisfies a certain system of relations, the set obtained by
exchanging the transmitter and the receiver satisfies the same
relations. In short, this means that the CSI is identical for both
links.
In this paper, we model the transmitter with its Thevenin
or Norton equivalent with transmit impedance ZT , and the
receiver with its receive impedance ZL. Moreover, we consider
the physical channel to be a system accessible in two ports,
Port 1 and Port 2, where the transmitter and the receiver are
attached (see Fig. (1)). The channel transfer functions (CTFs)
H1 and H2 defined as
1
H1 =
V2
V1g
H2 =
V1
V2g
(1)
(see Fig. 1) are equal in symmetric channels. Therefore, when
the receiver estimates for example H1 of the forward link,
it directly knows also H2 of the reverse link, without need
of further communication2. Such property serves as source
of common randomness from which the parties can generate
secret keys. An eavesdropper normally experiences a physical
channel that is independent of that of the legitimate users.
Therefore, the generated keys are intrinsically secure. In the
following, we name the two legitimate parties Alice (A) and
Bob (B) respectively, and we name the eavesdropper Eve (E).
We also assume that Eve is a passive attacker, i.e. she just
overhears the channel.
The basic idea of channel-based key generation approaches
is for Alice and Bob to obtain very correlated observations of
the channel via channel training, then to apply key generation
methods that rely on the correlated observations and public
discussion [14]. From an information-theoretic perspective, the
key generation procedure can be described as follows:
1) Channel sensing: Alice, Bob and Eve get the obser-
vations of length n of the CSI Xn = [X1, · · · , Xn],
Y n = [Y1, · · · , Yn], and Z
n = [Z1, · · · , Zn] respec-
tively, where the observations can be performed in time,
frequency, space domain or a combination of them.
2) Key reconciliation via public discussion: in order to
agree on a secret key, Alice and Bob can communi-
cate through the PB channel and send to each other
a deterministic communication sequence as follows.
They generate the random variables UA and UB respec-
tively, for initialization. Then, they alternatively send to
each other the two sequences SkA = [SA1 , · · · , SAk ]
and SkB = [SB1 , · · · , SBk ], respectively, where for
each step i we have SAi = fAi
(
UA, X
n, SBi−1
)
and
SBi = fBi
(
UB, Y
n, SAi−1
)
. At the end of the com-
munication step, Alice and Bob determine the respec-
tive keys as KA = fAk+1(UA, X
n, SkB) and KB =
fBk+1(UB, Y
n, SkA). Different protocols have been pro-
posed to implement both the reconciliation procedure,
implemented either with cascade or error correcting
codes, and the privacy amplification. An extended series
of references about this can be found in [14].
By definition [15], a secret key rate RK is achievable if for
every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a public
1We remark that (1) and the rest of the equations presented in this paper
are function of the frequency. This dependency is omitted in the notation for
simplicity.
2The wireless literature often refers to this property as due to the reciprocity
of the channel. This is technically incorrect, because in reciprocal networks
the CTF is not forcefully the same in the two directions. Although the wireless
channel is indeed reciprocal, it is also in most of the cases symmetric, as we
will explain in Section IV.
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Fig. 2. Trans-resistance a) and trans-conductance b) communication schemes
in PLN, with generator either on Port 1 or on Port 2.
communication strategy such that
Pr {KA 6= KB} < ε (2a)
1
n
I
(
KA;S
k
A, S
k
B, Z
n
)
< ε (2b)
1
n
H (KA) > RK − ε (2c)
1
n
log |K| <
1
n
H (KA) + ε, (2d)
where H(·) and I(·) denote the entropy and mutual infor-
mation operators and K is the key alphabet. Equation (2a)
means that KA and KB are equal, (2b) ensures that no
information is leaked to Eve and (2d) indicates that the
generated key is uniformely distributed. It is clear from (2)
that the possibility of generating at least one (RK > 1)
or multiple keys is based on three characteristics of the PB
medium: the temporal variation (i.e. the randomness) and the
correlation of the CSI between Alice and Bob, and the spatial
decorrelation of Eve. These three characteristics are fulfilled in
many wireless scenarios, where the channel varies frequently,
it is symmetric and the users typically experience uncorrelated
multipath fading. This practically means, respectively, that n
(considering observations in time) is low, Xn and Y n are
very correlated, which guarantees a fast convergence for the
condition (2a), and they are both uncorrelated with Zn, which
guarantees the convergence of (2b).
In the following, we analyze how the characteristics of the
power line medium can be used to retrieve highly correlated
CSI among Alice and Bob. Moreover, we discuss the physical
constraints that limit the achievable RK in PLN. Considering
the system model introduced in Fig. 1, we assume Alice to be
branched at Port 1 and Bob or Eve to be branched at Port 2,
depending on which CTF is of interest.
III. SYMMETRIES OF THE POWER LINE CHANNEL
In this section, we present under which conditions the power
line channel is symmetric. Under these conditions, the existing
PLS techniques developed for wireless can be similarly applied
to PLNs.
It has been shown in [11] that the power line channel is
symmetric if the impedance ZT at the transmission side is
equal to the load impedance ZL (see Fig. 1). Similarly, this
condition applies to the wireless channel and to any other
kind of passive network. However, while in wireless systems
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Fig. 3. Symmetry of the trans-impedance Z for different values of ZT and
ZL.
both ZT and ZL are set to the same value (usually 50Ω) to
maximize the power transmitted and received, the situation is
different in PLC.
In classical half-duplex PLC systems, maximum communi-
cation rate is obtained by maximizing the transferred voltage,
or more in general the SNR at the receiver [16]. Therefore,
PLMs are usually equipped with ZT ∼ 1Ω, ZL ∼ 10kΩ
and a switch that selects the correct impedance based on
the link status [17]. This renders the channel highly non
symmetric. On the other hand, in the recently proposed in-
band full duplex PLC technology, some front-end transceiver
architectures use the same equivalent impedance both for
transmission and reception chains [18]. Therefore, if the two
communication ends are equipped with modems that use an
equivalent impedance with the same value, the channel is
symmetric.
A third communication architecture, which has been not yet
proposed in the context of PLC, can be considered. It relies
on the fact that the PLC channel is reciprocal [12] to get
symmetric CSI. In fact, in any reciprocal two-port network
the following holds true [19]:
• When the current Ig is applied to any of the two ports,
the open circuit voltage measured at the other port is the
same. Referring to Fig. 2a, this means that the ratio Z21 =
V2/I1g is equal to the ratio Z12 = V1/I2g obtained when
the two ports are inverted, under the condition ZT =
ZL = ∞
• When the voltage Vg is applied to any of the two ports,
the short circuit current measured at the other port is
the same. Referring to Fig. 2b, this means that the ratio
Y21 = I2/V1g is equal to the ratio Y12 = I1/V2g obtained
when the two ports are inverted, under the condition that
ZT = ZL = 0.
Therefore, it is possible to obtain symmetric transmission
of signals considering the trans-impedance Z or the trans-
admittance Y of the network instead of the classical voltage
transfer function (see Fig. 2). However, the values of the
transmit and receive impedances under which this property
strictly holds are ideal and far from the common values of ZT
and ZL.
4We now consider less ideal conditions, taking the trans-
impedance case as an example. We name Z12 the one obtained
from transmission from Port 2 to Port 1 and Z21 the opposite
one. We also fix ZL to 10kΩ, as usual in PLM receivers and
modify the value of ZT . Fig. 3, which is obtained from a
dataset as discussed in Section V, shows that for low values of
ZT the trans-impedance is highly asymmetric. The symmetry
increases with the value of ZT , and when ZT reaches 10kΩ,
the trans-impedance is essentially symmetric. This condition
would be practically implementable in power line modems, by
driving the line with a current instead of a voltage [20] and
using a classical voltage receiver. Even though not shown, a
similar result is obtained in the trans-admittance case when
ZT and ZL are close to or less then 1Ω. Implementing this
solution in power line modems would imply to send a voltage
signal using a classical transmitter and to receive a current
signal over a very small impedance.
When ZT and ZL have values that are far from ideality,
the following method can be used to obtain symmetric CSI at
the two communication ends. Referring to the trans-impedance
case, we point out that if a circuit is adopted to measure the
PLN input impedance Zink at the Port k that is defined as
Zin =
Vk
Ik
, (3)
then, relying the voltage and current divider equations, we can
write
I1i =
ZT
Zin1 + ZT
I1g V2oc =
Zin2 + ZL
ZL
V2, (4)
I2i =
ZT
Zin2 + ZT
I2g V1oc =
Zin1 + ZL
ZL
V1, (5)
for the transmission from Port 1 and Port 2 respectively. Ii
is the actual current entering the network and Voc is the open
circuit voltage at the receiver. These two new quantities are
the equivalent of the injected current and received voltage if
the transmit and receive impedance were infinte. Similarly, in
the trans-admittance case we have
V1i =
Zin1
Zin1 + ZT
V1g I2cc =
Zin2 + ZL
Zin2
I2, (6)
V2i =
Zin2
Zin2 + ZT
V2g I1cc =
Zin1 + ZL
Zin1
I1, (7)
where Vi and Icc are the equivalent of the injected current and
received voltage if the transmit and receive impedance were
zero. This means that (4),(5),(6) and (7) allow us to reproduce
the conditions for symmetry in the respective systems. In fact,
the resulting trans-impedances Z
′
21 = V2oc/I1i and Z
′
12 =
V1oc/I2i, as well as the trans-admittances Y
′
21 = I2cc/V1i and
Y
′
12 = I1cc/V2i, are respectively equal, independently of the
actual values of ZT and ZL used.
In conclusion, a symmetry can be derived as explained also
using classical values of output and load impedances in PLMs.
A possible drawback of this method is that the receiver needs
to know both Zin1 and Zin2 . Hence, the value of Zin1 or Zin2
needs to be transmitted through the public channel with risk
of eavesdropping. However, a possible eavesdropper would not
have access to the values of V1 or V2 in the trans-impedance
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Fig. 4. Example of a PLC channel transfer function in the two directions, in
frequency a) and time b) domain.
case or to I1 or I2 in the trans-admittance case, which are a
trait of the intended receiver. Therefore, sharing information
about the channel input impedance at the transmitter and at the
receiver, does not directly enable an eventual eavesdropper to
estimate for example Z
′
21. This approach is further elaborated
and discussed in Section IV-B, where we do not limit to trans-
impedance or trans-admittance architectures, but we generalize
this method to any kind of communication architecture.
IV. KEY GENERATION IN HALF-DUPLEX PLC
In this Section, we propose two techniques to get common
information at the transmitter and the receiver with minimal
exchange of data. Both techniques rely on the fact that the
PLC channel is reciprocal, as discussed before.
A. Time-domain symmetry technique (TDST)
Considering a generic two port network, which in our case
represents the PLN, the transmission matrix is defined as [19]
[
V1
I1
]
=
[
A B
C D
] [
V2
I2
]
, (8)
where the subscripts 1 and 2 stand for the relative port. When
the system is reciprocal, which is always the case in passive
networks, the following relation holds true
AD − CB = 1. (9)
5With this condition, the transmission matrix in the opposite
direction becomes[
V2
I2
]
=
[
D B
C A
] [
V1
I1
]
. (10)
As shown in Appendix A, the time-domain response of (8)
and (10) is not strictly symmetric but wide-sense symmetric.
This means that the multipath response of the channel is
characterized by peaks that are in the same position both
when the signal travels from Port 1 to Port 2 and vice
versa. However, the amplitude of the peaks and their shape
are in general different, thus the PLC channel is not strictly
symmetric. As an example, Fig. 4 shows the frequency and
time domain response of a typical PLC channel in the two
communication directions. The frequency domain response is
far from symmetric, even though a certain degree of correlation
still exists. The wide-sense symmetry in time domain appears
clearly in Fig. 4b. Even though the amplitude of the peaks in
the two cases is rather different, we see that their position is
the same. The mismatches are due mainly to two reasons. On
one hand, high peaks might render lower peaks that are close
to them undetectable. On the other hand, the peak detection
algorithm and the bandwidth of the signal deeply influence the
estimation of the peak presence and position.
One way to compensate these errors and to construct a key
is to divide the time domain response h (or part of it) in N
blocks, each with duration ε (white and gray stripes in Fig.
4b). A binary key with N elements is generated at each node,
with all values initially set to 0. After channel estimation and
peak detection, every key element is set to one if at least
one peak is detected within its time block, so that the binary
key K is generated. This method can be further refined by
limiting the peak search to the first M blocks set to one. The
limit is set because, due to the multipath and the smoothing
effect of the channel, the density of the peaks tends to increase
and their granularity tends to decrease with the time index,
respectively. This means that every possible K would have a
lot of ones towards the end of the sequence, which results in
high similarity between different keys. Converserly, when the
limit to the first M ones is applied, there are higher chances
that the position of the ones in keys generated from Alice
and Eve are in different positions. Finally, key reconciliation
procedures, such as Slepian-Wolf coding [4] can be run as
presented in Section II to agree on the final key.
A drawback of the TDST is the generation rate of new keys,
which is very low or even zero. This is because the position of
the peaks in the time domain response is due to the topological
structure of the network. Thus, the key would change only
when a topology variation occurs. Small physical variations
of the channel, due for example to its periodic time variant
nature [21] or to impedance changes at the terminations, do
not in general affect the presence or the position of peaks
in the time domain channel response. The topology is only
modified when a power switch is activated to route the power
flow to a different section of the grid or when an anomaly like
a fault or a strong impedance change occurs [22].
In the case of transmission and medium voltage distribution
networks, topological variations might occur from hours to
weeks one from another. In the case of indoor or low voltage
distribution networks, the topology of PLNs is fixed unless
an anomaly occurs, therefore each communication pair can
generate just one code. Since frequent channel changes are
needed to prevent eventual eavesdroppers to retrieve the com-
munication key, this key generation technique is prone to be
decrypted over a long time period. Increased security could be
obtained, for example, by combining the TDST with classical
cryptographic methods to periodically refresh the key.
B. Transmission matrix technique (TMT)
Taking as starting point the normalization procedure pre-
sented in Section III, we can extend it to derive the full trans-
mission matrix of the communication link. For this purpose,
we assume the power line modems to be enabled to provide
an estimate H˜ of the frequency response H and Z˜in of the
channel input impedance Zin, respectively [23].
Since the parameters A, B, C and D of the transmission
matrix are the same in the two directions, their estimation at
one communication end would enable the complete electrical
characterization of the channel in both directions. Relying on
(1),(3),(8) and (10) we can write the following equations
Zin1 =
V1
I1
,=
A+ B
ZL
C + D
ZL
, (11)
H1 =
V2
V1g
=
ZL
ZLA+B + ZLZTC + ZTD
, (12)
Zin2 =
V2
I2
,=
D + B
ZL
C + A
ZL
, (13)
H2 =
V1
V2g
=
ZL
ZLD +B + ZLZTC + ZTA
. (14)
The four complex unknowns A, B, C, D, can be found by
solving a system made with these four complex equations
[24]. However, solving this system at each communication
end requires information about Zin, H1, Zin2 and H2 to be
shared on the PB channel. This would allow also any potential
eavesdropper to solve the system, resulting in no secrecy.
On the other hand, relying on (9), another system of
equations can be written. Considering for example the user
connected at Port 2, he can directly estimate H1, by relying on
classical pilot signals used in communication systems [25], and
Zin2 with an impedance sensor. At this point, considering also
(9), only one equation is missing to derive the transmission
matrix. Therefore, the value of either Zin1 or H1 has to be
sent through the PB channel. If, for example, the information
about Zin1 is shared, then the user can solve the system

Zin1 =
A+ B
ZL
C+ D
ZL
H1 =
ZL
ZLA+B+ZLZTC+ZTD
AD − CB = 1
Zin2 =
D+ B
ZL
C+ A
ZL
(15)
With the estimated values of the transmission matrix, the user
connected at Port 2 can estimate H2 using (14). At this point,
6all the PLS techniques presented in Section II can be applied.
The same procedure applies to the user connected at Port 1,
with the transmission of information about Zin1.
Since with this method the transmission matrix is estimated
by both legitimate users, the key can be generated from any
of the transmission matrix parameters or from a function of
them. Even though some information is shared through the PB
channel, a possible eavesdropper will not be able to correctly
estimate the transmission matrix between the legitimate users,
since it will at maximum have three equations available. When
the cryptographic key is based on the degree of freedom left
to the legitimate users, then the eavesdropper has no mean to
retrieve the key.
Regarding the estimation procedure, since H1, Zin1 and
Zin2 are constant as long as the transmission matrix is
constant, their best estimates H˜1, ˜Zin1 and ˜Zin2 are given
by averaging over time, assuming zero mean noise [26]. A˜,
B˜, C˜, D˜, are then simply derived by directly solving (15).
When the channel state changes, the estimation procedure can
be repeated and a new cryptographic key is generated.
Different methods can be proposed to quantize and arrange
the selected CSI. First of all, we consider the absolute value of
the magnitude of the selected CSI to be linearly quantized over
2nbits − 1 levels for every frequency bin. Then, we consider
two ways of arranging the data:
• Binary: the quantized data are converted to binary se-
quences with Gray encoding to minimize the distance
between symbols that are close to each other. Each binary
symbol is used as a symbol of the key.
• Coded: the key is defined over an 2nbits-ary alphabet
and each symbol is made by the quantized value of the
CSI at one frequency bin. One symbol at the end of the
key sequence accounts for the actual value of the least
significant bit. The actual key is generated by multiplying
the values of all the symbols by the last one. This method
is used to avoid data with similar shape but different
amplitudes to produce similar keys.
These two methods will be compared in Section V, where we
consider as an example the key to be derived from H˜2. We
remark that other quantization methods are possible. However,
a thorough comparison of quantization methods is out of the
scope of this paper.
As mentioned before, the PLC channel is typically ciclo-
stationary with period equal to the mains semi-cicle and can
be roughly subdivided into a series of slots in which it is
considered static. Such intervals typically are in the order of
some hundreds of microseconds [21]. Hence, the number of
cryptographic keys that can be generated for a given node
pair using the proposed method is equal to the number of
time slots in the particular scenario. Since the state variations
are much higher at frequencies below 5 MHz than above, a
higher number of and less correlated keys are likely to be
generated using narrow-band PLC, which uses the spectrum
3-500 kHz, than broad-band PLC, which uses the spectrum 2-
86 MHz. Therefore, the proposed method for key generation
is expected to have the best performance when applied to
distribution networks, where PLC are used mainly within the
narrow-band spectrum.
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V. PRACTICAL RESULTS
The results presented in this paper are based on the mea-
surement campaign presented in [27]. In this measurement
campaign, the full transmission matrix of a total of 1312
in-home channels divided in 3 sites has been measured in
the frequency range from 0.1 to 80 MHz. We chose this
dataset because, to our knowledge, it is the only one available
with measurements of the full transmission matrix. However,
considering the results of other measurement campaigns con-
ducted on distribution grids [28], we expect our results to be
qualitatively applicable also in the outdoor scenario.
A. Channel correlation
As presented in Section II, one fundamental property to
generate secure keys from the physical channel is the strong
correlation between the two forward and reverse channels from
Alice to Bob and vice-versa. At the same time, both the Alice
to Eve and Bob to Eve channels have to be as low correlated as
possible w.r.t. the two legitimate channels. Therefore, in this
section we analyze the spatial correlation of PLC channels,
independently on the key generation method used.
A first work presented in [27] defined the space-frequency
correlation as
Rℓ,m =
Ei,j
[
Hi (ℓ)H
∗
j (m)
]
√
Ei
[
|Hi (ℓ)|
2
]
Ej
[
|Hj (m)|
2
] , (16)
where i and j stand for the channel realization indexes, E [·]
is the expectation operator, ℓ and m stand for the frequency
bin indexes, and H is the CTF of a specific channel. The
correlation is computed as an expectation over all the channels
that share the same transmitter and over all the possible
transmitters. The results show that the average correlation
between the channel transfer functions from or to different
outlets is rather low, but it increases to values around 0.3 when
the absolute values of H are considered.
In this work, especially in the case of the TMT, information
about the input impedance is shared, and Eve is interested in
7TABLE I
E [ρ] OF THE CHANNEL TRANSFER FUNCTION IN DIFFERENT CASES
Alice↔Bob Alice↔Eve Ratio
CTF (18) 0.4452 0.1668 2.67
CTF absolute values 0.6298 0.4798 1.31
Impulse response 0.4285 0.1147 3.74
TDST (20) 0.5089 0.1808 2.81
retrieving Hab and Hba from it (see Section IV-B). Therefore,
it is of interest to compute
Cℓ,m =
Ei,j
[
Zini (ℓ)H
∗
Zinj
(m)
]
√
Ei
[
|Zini (ℓ)|
2
]
Ej
[∣∣HZinj (m)∣∣2
] , (17)
where HZin and Zin share the same transmitter. The results in
Fig. 5, where we fixed l = m, show that |C| is on average low,
but the frequency-space correlation Cabs, computed using the
absolute values, is on the other side not negligible. Therefore,
it is recommended, when generating secure keys with the
TMT, to make use of the estimated complex values and not
just their magnitude.
It makes also sense to use a broader definition of correlation,
which is not dependent on the frequency bin, but just on
the channel realization. To this purpose, we consider the
deterministic correlation coefficient ρH , defined as
ρHi,j =
∑L
ℓ=1Hi (ℓ)H
∗
j (ℓ)∑L
ℓ=1 |Hi (ℓ)|
2∑L
ℓ=1 |Hj (ℓ)|
2
, (18)
where L is the total number of frequency bins considered.
The results are plotted in Fig. 6, where the left picture shows
the results for |ρH | and the right one shows ρHabs, which is
the correlation as in (18) computed with the absolute value
of the transfer functions. On the main diagonal, instead of
plotting the autocorrelation of each channel, which would
be one, we plot ρH between the Alice to Bob and the
Bob to Alice channels. The results show that the power line
channels are rather uncorrelated (left), and that the correlation
increases when the absolute values of the transfer functions
are considered (right). The correlation between the channels
of the legitimate parties is on average higher than that with
Eve, but still not significant (see Tab. I).
In Fig. 7, we plot ρZ computed as
ρZi,j =
∑L
ℓ=1 Zi (ℓ)Z
∗
j (ℓ)∑L
ℓ=1 |Zi (ℓ)|
2∑L
ℓ=1 |Zj (ℓ)|
2
. (19)
The results show that the input impedances are more corre-
lated than the channel transfer functions, especially when the
absolute values are considered. This might be due to the fact
that the input impedance is, notably at high frequencies, very
dependent on the characteristic impedance of the cable the
modem is branched to. If different outlets are branched to
cables with similar characteristic impedances, then a certain
degree of correlation is expected.
B. Time-domain symmetry technique results
As presented in Section IV-A, the time-domain channel
transfer function is not expected to be more correlated than
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the frequency domain one, since h is made by peaks that
have different heights in the two directions. The results when
computing (18) for the impulse response are similar to those
obtained with the CTF. In fact, the correlation between the
Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice channels is almost the same
in the two cases and only with Eve the correlation is slightly
lower in the impulse response case (see Table I).
In order to localize the peaks needed to apply the TDST,
we considered different spectral analysis techniques, both
parametric and non-parametric [29]. Given the wide bandwidth
available, the best results have been achieved using a non-
parametric technique that consists of interpolating the original
estimated time domain trace and applying the energy based
peak detection technique presented in [30]. The interpolation
filter is a truncated sinc, which is equivalent to zero padding in
frequency domain. Although the interpolation does not reveal
any more information about the presence of peaks, it greatly
improves the estimation of their location.
Fig. 8 shows the average of the correlation coefficient ρh¯
computed as
ρKi,j =
∑L
ℓ=1Ki (ℓ)K
∗
j (ℓ)∑L
ℓ=1 |Ki (ℓ)|
2∑L
ℓ=1 |Kj (ℓ)|
2
, (20)
as a function of the number M of the peaks considered, for
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Fig. 8. Correlation R of the sequence of peaks computed by Alice, Bob and
Eve (a) and their ratios (b), considering the first M peaks.
different amounts of interpolation points. As for the length of
the key h¯, we set it to N=200 elements, which are obtained
by segmenting the impulse response in 200 time blocks, each
with duration ε = 3TS , where TS is the sampling period after
interpolation. The results show that when M increases, the
correlation between the keys generated from Alice and Eve
increases linearly, while the correlation coefficient ρh¯ between
Alice and Bob almost saturates after the first steps. This
means that considering high values of M for key generation
might reduce the security of the key. On the other hand,
using very low values of M reduces the correlation of the
legitimate parties and also simplifies the work needed by Eve
to infer the key by a series of random guesses. Concerning
the interpolation, increasing the number of interpolation points
slightly reduces the correlation between Alice and Eve, but
drastically reduces the one with Eve. This is particularly
clear in Fig. 8b, which shows that the ratio between the two
correlations is, for example, the same when using M = 1 and
no interpolation andM = 9 and 3-point interpolation. The use
of interpolation is therefore encouraged in order to generate
secure keys.
C. Transmission matrix technique results
As explained in Sec. IV-B, the TMT allows to obtain
common CSI between Alice and Bob avoiding Eve to access
it. Since the technique consists of solving a fully determined
system, possible mismatches are only due to the presence of
noise. For example, higher estimation errors are expected when
external electromagnetic interference impinges differently on
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Fig. 9. Statistical distribution of ∆ in dB scale for different frequencies.
the two communication ends. It has been shown in [12], that
in the case of PLNs this effect is limited. Considering for
example the key to be generated from H2, Fig. 9 depicts the
difference
∆ =
∣∣∣∣∣
H˜A2 − H˜
B
2
H˜A2
∣∣∣∣∣ , (21)
where H˜A2 is the CTF estimated by Alice and H˜
B
2 is the one
estimated by Bob in the presence of disturbances. The values
of ∆ are on average in the range -25 dB to -35 dB, with one
exception around 10 MHz, where higher values are shown.
These higher values are due to disturbances caused by amateur
radio transmissions.
D. Quantization results
In order to assess the overall efficiency of the proposed
methods, in this section we analyze the distance d between
the keys generated by the legitimate users and by Eve, using
the TDST and the TMT combined with different quantization
methods. We define the distance d between two keys with
equal length N as
d =
∑N
i=1
∣∣∣KAi −KB,Ei
∣∣∣
max (max (KA) ,max (KB,E))
, (22)
where KA is the key generated by Alice, KB,E is the key
generated by Bob or Eve. This definition of distance is a
normalized version of the classical Hamming distance [31].
The two are equal in the binary case, i.e. when KAi ,K
B,E
i ∈
[0, 1] ∀i. When the keys are not made of binary symbols,
(22) ensures that the maximum distance between each symbol
is 1. This enables an easy comparison between different
quantization methods over the same data source.
Fig. 10 shows the results regarding the TDST. We notice in
Fig. 10a that as the number M of bins set to 1 increases, the
average dAlice↔Bob only slightly increases and it is almost
independent from the interpolation used. On the other side,
the average dAlice↔Bob rapidly detaches from the maximum
possible d, especially with low values of interpolation. These
results confirm what had already been deducted from the
correlation analysis in Section V-B. Regarding the results in
Fig. 10b, we considered all the peaks present in N blocks.
We notice that in this case dAlice↔Bob is rather influenced by
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the interpolation factor. This is due to the fact that, while the
first few peaks in the time domain CTF are well separated
and sharp, the density and the smoothness of the other peaks
increases, due to the multipath and the cable attenuation.
Therefore, with increasing N there are much more and less
detectable peaks, which in turn increases dAlice↔Bob.
Fig. 11 and 12 show the results regarding the TMT. Fig.
11a shows that, considering the same code length N , the
TMT with binary symbols quantized with 8 bits has a similar
performance to the TDST with 5-point interpolation. On the
other hand, the best results in terms of dAlice↔Bob are achieved
by the TMT coded method, although also dAlice↔Eve is rather
low. However, the ratio between the average dAlice↔Eve and
the average dAlice↔Bob is maximized with this technique (see
Fig. 11b), which therefore ensures the best security of the key
among the proposed methods.
We finally consider the effect of the number of bits used for
quantization on d. As depicted in Fig. 12, while E[d] increases
with the number of bits in the TMT binary case, it is almost
independent from it in the other case. In fact, since the CFT
estimated by Alice and Bob are rather close to each other (cfr
Fig. 9), the same holds also for the quantized values. When
the number of bits increases, d for each symbol decreases,
but at the same time the number of symbols with non-null
d increases, these two effects compensating each other. In the
TMT binary case, on the other hand, d for each symbol cannot
slowly decrease towards 0, since the alphabet is binary, while
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the number of symbols with non-null d increases with N .
In conclusion, we found that the best results in term of
average d are achieved when considering a limited number of
peaks and a high interpolation factor in the case of the TDST.
Regarding the TMT, the length of the key or the number of
quantization levels does not play a fundamental role, but rather
the method to arrange the data. Among those proposed, the
TMT coded yields the best results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented different ways of enhancing
physical layer security in power line networks exploiting the
channel properties. On one side, the power line channel is
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symmetric when either full duplex, transresitance or transcon-
ductance communication architectures are used. In this case,
the existing methods for physical layer security in symmetric
networks can be applied. On the other side, when the classical
half duplex architecture is used, the power line channel is not
symmetric, but just reciprocal. We showed some fundamental
properties of reciprocal channels that enable the generation of
secret keys with minimal exchange of information between the
two legitimate users. In particular, the wide-sense symmetry of
reciprocal channels has been used to propose a CSI based key
generation method that relies on peak analysis and generates
highly correlated information at the two communication ends
with no exchange of key information. Another CSI based key
generation method has been proposed, which relies on the
estimation of the transmission matrix of the link at the two
ends with minimal exchange of information about it through
the broadcast channel.
We also presented an analysis of the spatial correlation in
power line networks based on a measurement dataset. The
results showed that the power line channels have low spatial
correlation, which is even lower when complex valued CSI is
considered.
We finally generated secret keys by quantizing with different
methods the gathered CSI and assessed their reliability by
computing a specifically formulated distance between the
different keys. The results showed that the distance between
the keys generated by Alice and Bob is on average much lower
than the distance between the keys generated by Alice and Eve.
This guarantees a good level of security of the generated keys.
This paper opens a path for new research efforts in physical
layer security for reciprocal networks. Further developments
might include key agreement protocols, the incorporation of
other common information at the two communication ends
and the combination of the proposed techniques with classical
cryptographic methods.
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APPENDIX A
WIDE-SENSE SYMMETRY OF TOPOLOGY INVARIANT
CHANNELS
According to the Fourier signal theory, every discrete signal
X in frequency domain can be written in the form
Xi =
+∞∑
k=−∞
Λke
jωitk , (23)
where i is the frequency bin index, j is the imaginary unit, ω
is the radiant frequency, t is the time and Λ is a constant. In
many application cases, like for the PLC case [22], the signal
can be represented by the sum of K dominant exponentials as
Xi =
K∑
k=1
Λi,ke
jωitk , (24)
where the minor effects due to the other exponentials are
accounted for in Λi,k. In our case, X stands for either A,
B, C or D in (8). The form of (24) corresponds to a series
of smoothed deltas in time domain, i.e. the inverse Fourier
transform xi of Xi is
xi =
K∑
k=1
λi,k ∗ δ (t− tk) , (25)
where λ is the inverse Fourier transform of Λ and ∗ is the
convolution operator. The delays in (25) represent the time of
arrival of each path the signal traveled through. The values of
each λi,k and tk can be derived from the eigenstructure of the
autocorrelation matrix RX of X = [X1 . . . XN ] , N > K ,
where N is the total number of considered frequency bins
[29]. In particular, the values of tk ∀k = 1 . . .K , i.e. the
position of the smoothed peaks, are directly derived from the
eigenvectors of RX.
We now consider the CTF of PLC channels. Relying on
(12), (14) and (24) we can write
H1,i =
1∑K
k=1 α1,iΛi,ke
jωitk
(26)
and
H2,i =
1∑K
k=1 α2,iΛi,ke
jωitk
, (27)
respectively, where α is a multiplicative constant representing
ZT , ZL or their product. We remark that, although the α
coefficients are different in (26) and (27), the exponentials
are exactly the same. However, in general α1 and α2 are
different functions of frequency, which in time domain results
in a different peak pattern for h1 and h2. Nonetheless, if ZT
and ZL are known, α1 and α2 can be deconvolved from the
CFT. Otherwise, we remark that in practical cases ZT and
ZL are set to constant values over the band of interest (see
Section III). Since the two are proportional to each other, then
also α1 is proportional to α2. This means that α1 and α2 have
the same propagation modes, and therefore this holds also for
(26) and (27).
In conclusion, if α1,i and α2,i are deconvolved from (26)
and (27) or if they are proportional to each other, 1/H1,i
and 1/H2,i have the same propagation modes and, therefore,
the same sequence of delta functions in time domain. We
define this property as wide-sense time-domain symmetry of
reciprocal systems. According to the Fourier theory, also H1
and H2 can be written in the form of (24) and, since their
inverse have the same propagation modes, this also holds true
for H1 and H2.
The wide-sense symmetry can also be explained as follows.
Since the network topology is invariant in PLNs, but also
in wireless networks with the assumption of a time invariant
channel, the possible signal paths between a transmitter and
a receiver are fixed. When communication in the opposite
direction is considered, the signal must travel the same paths,
even though in a different direction and in a different order.
These differences cause the signal to receive a different
attenuation in the two directions. But what does not change is
the length of each of those paths. Therefore, the position of
the peaks in time domain is independent from the direction of
the communication, but depends only on the position of the
two modems in the network.
We remark that the wide-sense symmetry does not hold
true for Zin1 and Zin2. In fact, considering (11) and (13),
the exponential sequences of A, B, C and D are combined
through a nonlinear equation that is different for Zin1 and
Zin2, thus resulting in different propagation modes and peak
sequences in time domain.
